



W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER R   N NO O. .   1 19 90 0 
 
Information Gathering, Disclosure and 














University of Naples Federico II 
 
University of Salerno 
 
Bocconi University, Milan 
CSEF - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance – UNIVERSITY OF SALERNO 
84084 FISCIANO (SA) - ITALY 




W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER R   N NO O. .   1 19 90 0 
 
 
Information Gathering, Disclosure and 







Abstract   
The paper studies the determinants of information gathering in insurance and credit markets. In our set-up, 
information may have either operational or strategic value, e.g. it may improve allocative decisions or allow agents 
to appropriate a larger share of gains from trade at the contracting stage. The timing of information gathering is 
endogenous and agents can gather information either before or after contracting. Access to precontractual 
information generates a negative contracting externality, which was first identified in Hirshleifer.s (1971) seminal 
contribution. In contrast with a well established conventional wisdom and a substantial literature, we prove that, if 
the operational value of information is positive and not "too small", private returns of information fall short of its 
social returns, and pre-contractual access to information leads to under-investment . On the contrary, agents 
over-invest in information gathering activities, when the operational value of the available signals is sufficiently 
low. Consistently with contractual arrangements observed in the real world, we also show that equilibrium 
contracts have also a very simple shape when private information can be voluntarily disclosed. 
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  1 Introduction
Agents trading in insurance and credit markets spend large amounts of resources to obtain better assess-
ments of the likelihood of future events, such as the occurrence of health disease or a monetary loss, or the
success of an entrepreneurial project. What determines individual decision to acquire and disclose infor-
mation and the timing of information gathering activities ? How ￿nancial contracts should be designed
in order to provide appropriate private incentives to gather information ? Can private returns of informa-
tion exceed or fall short of its social returns? These are key issues for the functioning of ￿nancial markets
where most of the information used by the agents is indeed acquired. As dramatic e¢ ciency advances
of information technologies are rising policy concerns in many sectors, including the medical and genetic
industries1, these issues have recently gained a prominent place also in the public debate. Understanding
whether and under which conditions private and social returns of information may diverge is indeed the
necessary ￿rst step of any welfare analysis investigating the e⁄ects of better access to information.
Following Jack Hirshleifer (1971), several contributions in the literature have showed that public
di⁄usion of information before contracting reduces agents welfare by destroying trading opportunities
(Green (1981), Marshall (1974), Wilson (1975) Schlee (2001), Morris-Shin (2002)). A substantial related
literature has also argued that agents overinvest in information gathering activities whenever they can
acquire private information before trading (Hirshleifer (1971),Shavell (1994), Reingaum (1989) Khalil-
Kremer -Rochet (1998), Bergeman-Valimaki (2002)), among others). In another seminal contribution,
Khalil and Kremer (1992) show that agents never gather socially wasteful information (e.g. information
with negative social value) under optimal contracting. One of the main purpose of this paper is to argue
that, in a richer contracting environment, opposite results often hold true : under mild conditions, agents
under-invest in (private) information gathering activities if the operational value of information is positive
and not "too small"; while they over-invest in these activities when information has negative social value.
We study a market where agents trade with intermediaries to obtain funds or to ensure themselves,
and can acquire information on their own characteristics (types), or on the value of an asset they own.
This information can be useful either for operational purposes, in order to improve the quality of al-
locative decisions, or for strategic reasons, to appropriate larger shares of gains from trade. Following a
line of research opened by Khalil and Kremer, our purpose is to investigate the determinants of infor-
mation gathering activities in an environment where their timing is endogenous. The key assumptions
of our model are that agents can disclose information to their contractual counterpart either before or
after contracting, while contracts can set payments contingent on the information disclosed either at
the contracting stage or after contracting. Noteworthy, these assumptions are in line with real world
contracts. For instance, insurance companies commonly o⁄er health insurance policies which set health
care reimbursement contingent on the disclosure of medical tests to be passed after contracting. While,
1In this past decade much attention has been centered on the Human Genome Project for promoting health and preventing
disease. Human Genome knowledge can provide individuals with the opportunity for screening and identifying many genetic
disorders and opens important issues concerning the insurability of health risks.
2often, insurance contracts also prescribe or allow insurance premia to be revised after the disclosure of
new information on clients￿prospective health. Moreover, the availability and the price of credit for an
entrepreneur opening a credit line generally depends also on the information concerning the quality of his
project, which is disclosed after contracting as time goes by.
On the modelling side, allowing agents to gather information after contracting avoids imposing ar-
bitrary restrictions of the contract space. Indeed, even in the ￿rst best-benchmark where asymmetric
information issues are absent2, information must in general be acquired after contracting for potential
gains from trade to be fully exploited3, .
The point of departure of our analysis is that, according to the key observation of Hirshleifer, private
information acquired before contracting has a positive strategic value, independently from its operational
value, as it allows to better assess the terms of trade which are o⁄ered in the market. To the extent
that an agent￿ s access to private information reduces expected gains of his potential contractual parties,
however, it also creates a welfare reducing contractual externality. To illustrate, consider a test which
permits to better identify the likelihood of a disease or a genetic disorder. Prior to testing, competing
insurance companies are willing to o⁄er him insurance at a "fair" unitary price, equal to the probability
that the health problem is identi￿ed. A major problem arises, however, if individuals can acquire a
(su¢ ciently accurate and cheap) health test before seeking insurance and keep private the result of the
test : ex ante fair prices become unpro￿table since only those who discover bad news, and hence are more
likely to be unhealthy, will insure themselves. Thus, precontractual testing results in an adverse selection
of the pool of insurance applicants, making unviable mutually bene￿cial trades. 4. Private bene￿ts from
private testing may then lead private and social returns of information to diverge. As a by product, the
fear of bad selection e⁄ects may induce insurance companies to ration the amount of insurance o⁄ered,
or to impose test-contingent discriminatory pricing in order to reduce asymmetric information at the
contracting stage.
A large literature exploring the e⁄ects of the negative contractual externalities created by private
information gathering activities has proved in several context, and at an increasing level of generality,
that these externalities may lead agents to overinvest in information. These results, however, rely on
somewhat restrictive assumptions; indeed, they are proved in settings where agents can gather information
only before contracting5, or ￿nancial trades are unnecessary to fully exploit information 6. By relaxing
these assumptions, we show that a careful analysis of intermediaries￿(principals) market behavior may
change the conventional wisdom prevailing in the literature, and that the Pigouvian logic, according
2An appropriate comparison between social and private returns of information gathering activities, e.g., between a fully
e¢ cient and a second best setting, then requires the agents￿actions space to be the same in the two cases.
3This is just an application of the general principle that trades must precede actions for markets to be e¢ cient.
4In the extreme case where the agent is fully informed about his individual state an intermediary o⁄ering a contract to
him will make losses with certainty.
5A very important exception in the literature is the article of Khalil and Kremer. They consider a setting where information
has negative social vaue (e.g. no operational value) and agents￿information gathering choices are of a 0-1 type - agents can
decide to gather either a perfectly informative signal or no signal- and show that agents do not gather information in the
second best).
6This assumption is common in the innovation literature on patent races where the overinvestment result is also common.
3to which negative (resp. positive) externalities result in overinvestment (resp. under-investment) may
turn out to be inappropriate for understanding the external e⁄ects of private information gathering.
Speci￿cally, in contrast with all the previous literature, we demonstrate that agents generally under-
invest in information when the social value of information is not too small. Moreover, in contrast with
the seminal work of Khalil and Kremer, we also show that agents generally over-invest in information
gathering whenever information has a negative net social value, but is relatively inexpensive and not
perfectly accurate.
The value of precontractual information, and hence agents￿private incentives to gather information
before contracting, are generally determined by the whole set of contracts they are o⁄ered; moreover, an
agent who decides to gather precontractual information causes a non negligible reduction of the pro￿t
made by th principals he trade with. For these reasons, rational intermediaries do not take agents￿ac-
tions as given, but design contracts aimed at protecting themselves against the contractual externalities
created by the agents. This paper characterizes equilibrium contracts and information gathering strate-
gies, and shows how in a competitive environment principals use di⁄erent contractual instruments, e.g.
payments schedule and information requirements, to deter agents from gathering precontractual infor-
mation. Precisely, we show that in equilibrium intermediaries generally o⁄er contracts which prescribe
agents to gather socially suboptimal amount of information after contracting and ration transfers across
agnts individual states, in order to make less advantageous private precontractual information. In a ￿nal
section of the paper, we extend the model to consider the case where agents can gather information only
after contracting but can opt-out from the contract they have signed after contracting.
In our setting agents￿ s endowment as well the return of their investment in a production or a loss
reduction technology are uncertain. Agents can gather private information by acquiring signals which
allow to update their initial assessments on the likelihood of future states. Available signals are ordered
according to their informativeness, and either earlier or more accurate information is costlier. Agents can
also voluntarily disclose the information they have gathered; crucially, however, they cannot prove their
ignorance to contractual parties at the contracting stage. For instance, an agent can disclose the result of
a medical test to his insurer, but cannot prove that he has not undertaken any test, whenever this is the
case. Contracts between principals and agents can set payments contingent either on publicly observable
variables or on the information disclosed by agents.
Within this setting, private precontractual information gathering is formally equivalent, from the view-
point of an agent, to acquire an option which gives him the opportunity to choose an o⁄er after some payo⁄
relevant uncertainty is resolved. Crucially, however, the "price" an agent has to pay for this option is sim-
ply equal to the cost of precontractual information gathering, and is not paid to the intermediaries o⁄ering
the "underlying" contracts, whose pro￿tability is reduced by the option. For these reasons, whenever the
cost of precontractual information is su¢ ciently low, access to private precontractual information by the
agents reduces the set of mutually convenient trades that intermediaries can o⁄er, and makes unviable
￿rst best trades. Competing intermediaries can then o⁄er either contracts which prescribe precontractual
information disclosure and make non negative pro￿ts on informed agents (on agents who disclose infor-
4mation before contracting), or, in alternative, contracts designed to attract only the uninformed (which
meet appropriate incentive compatibility). As we show, relevant incentive compatibility conditions for
the latter types of contracts are then jointly determined by all the contracts o⁄ered in the market : either
the ones designed to attract uninformed agents or those requiring precontractual information disclosure.
In particular, this is true since o⁄ering more favorable contracts to the informed agents makes precon-
tractual information gathering more advantageous and hence more di¢ cult to deter. By exploiting the
properties of these constraints, we demonstrate that the set of contracts o⁄ered in equilibrium contains :
(i) all "interim e¢ cient" contracts which make zero pro￿t on agents who gather and disclose information
before contracting and (ii) the non negative pro￿t contract which is preferred by the agent within the set
of contracts that deter precontractual information, given that all "interim e¢ cient" contracts are o⁄ered.
In equilibrium, agents always accept the latter, i.e. all information is taken after contracting. However,
the fear of inducing agents to gather precontractual information will lead intermediaries to ration trans-
fers towards "bad" individual states in order to discourage precontractual information gathering. For
instance, in an health insurance market insurers will generally reduce either promised reimbursements or
corresponding premia, in order to deter the precontractual information. Lower reimbursement in bad
health states, indeed, reduce the bene￿t that an agent obtains by gathering precontractual information
and purchasing more insurance conditional on bad news. Thus, in equilibrium, competition by ￿nancial
intermediaries plays a double role: it de￿nes the market opportunities for uninformed agents, and, at
the same time, it contributes to determine the value of precontractual information. Indeed, competitive
pressures lead intermediaries to o⁄er the best possible deals not only to the agents who do not gather
precontractual information but also to the ones that gather and disclose it. Noteworthy, the latter e⁄ect
of competition is welfare reducing as it makes incentive constraints more severe.
We also shows that minimizing second best losses leads intermediaries to condition equilibrium payo⁄s
not only to the realization of the state of the world, as it would be the case in the ￿rst best, but also on
the news gathered after contracting. In the real world, contracts of this type are in fact widely used either
in insurance or in ￿nancial markets. Moreover, under mild conditions competitive contracts have also
a simple shape, consistently with real world arrangements, but in contrast with the predictions of most
second best models. In particular in insurance settings, equilibrium contracts o⁄ered by the insurers are
standard insurance schemes imposing a positive deductible and a maximal repayment. While contracts
o⁄ered by lenders to agents dealing with a funding problem are debt contracts with a very limited umber
of covenants.
We then exploit the characterization of equilibrium allocations to investigate the determinants of infor-
mation gathering decisions. We ￿rst show that if available signals are not perfectly informative, and have
negative social (operational net) value but relatively low cost, agents overinvest in information gathering
in equilibrium. Intermediaries require socially wasteful information to be gathered after contracting in
order to discourage precontractual information gathering. Essentially, this result follows from the fact
that expected gains from precontractual information are proportional to the magnitude of the transfers
towards "bad" individual states that the agent can implement by trading. Thus, if the cost of informa-
5tion gathering is small, contracts o⁄ered to non informed agents must implement small transfers across
individual states in order to deter precontractual information gathering. If information is su¢ ciently
noisy and inexpensive, however, informed and non informed are similar types from an intermediary￿ s
viewpoint (e.g. face similar distributions of future states). For this reason, an agent who gathers and
discloses information before contracting can obtain in the market an allocation close to his ￿rst best
allocation (the one he would receive were access to precontractual information precluded), whatever news
he reveals. Whenever this is the case, contracts prescribing to gather information with negative social
value minimimize second best losses due to private access to information, and are o⁄ered in equilibrium;
so that agents oveinvest in information gathering. The opposite result holds true when the operational
value of information is positive and not "too small". In this case, as we show, precontractual access to
private information leads agents to under-invest in information gathering. This is because a (slight)
reduction in the informativeness of the signal that the agent is required to gather after contracting al-
lows to relax incentive constraints, while having only negligible (second order) e⁄ects on the returns of
information. Speci￿cally, we prove that, this incentive e⁄ect arises because, under mild conditions, the
less informative is the signal that an agent is required to gather after contracting the less advantageous
is for him to acquire that signal before contracting. Intuitively, this is for the following reason. First,
expected gains from precontractual information are proportional to the expected utility that the agent
obtains when he discloses good news before contracting, since disclosing these news at the contracting
stage allows to obtain more favorable terms of trades in the market. Second, as we show, the expected
utility an agent can obtain in the market conditional on disclosing good news (e.g. realization of a signal
indicating that favorable contingencies are more likely) is increasing in the quality of the signal delivering
those news. Thus, reducing the quality of the signal that the agent is required to gather after contracting
also decreases the expected consumption that informed agents observing good news before contracting can
obtain by revealing their information to the market, and, hence, makes it easier to deter precontractual
information.
Finally, in a section which contains some extensions to the basic model, we show that the incentive
problem that principals face whether agents can gather precontractual information or can acquire infor-
mation only after contracting, but can opt-out from the contract they have signed after contracting, are
essentially the same; and, for this reason, all the results proved in one setting extend in a straightforward
way to the other. These results allow to demonstrate our analysis also applies to insurance and credit
settings where long terms contracts are often not enforceable.
2 Set-up
We consider an economy with a continuum of agents, and large number of competing intermediaries
(principals). Intermediary compete by o⁄ering exclusive contracts to the agents, they can either fund
their investments in a risky technology, or insure them against idiosyncratic shocks to their endowment.
Each agent can gather private information on his distribution of individual states either before or after
6contracting.
Preferences and endowments Agents are ex ante identical and consume one physical good, x; in
di⁄erent individual states of the world. There exists a ￿nite number, S; of individual states of the world
which are identically and independently distributed across agents; ps denotes the prior probability of state
s, while ws is the state s contingent endowment of the agent; throughout it will be convenient to assume
ws+1 ￿ ws for all s. Principals are risk-neutral and maximize their expected pro￿t. Agents￿preferences
are assumed to be state independent, and are represented by the certainty utility function u(x), which is
strictly concave and twice di⁄erentiable.
Production Each agent can choose an action a belonging to the set A ￿ <, representing an investment
whose net return, r(a;s), depends on s. The function r(a;s) is assumed to be strictly concave in a, with
ra(a;s) > 0 for all s. We shall also assume that ra(a;s) is monotone in s; e.g.,the return function r() may
display either increasing or decreasing ￿rst di⁄erences. In the former case, returns and the endowments
are independently distributed or positively correlated; and r() can be suitably interpreted as a production
technology. Indeed, while independence between r() and w is often a natural assumption in the analysis
of production decisions, positive correlation between these two variables may arise in the presence of
non transferable resources such as health or human capital. For instance, the investment returns of an
entrepreneur undertaking a project will depend positively on his own human capital endowment whenever
human capital is not perfectly transferable and hence cannot be purchased. Di⁄erently, the assumption
that ra(a;s) is decreasing in s is often appropriate to describe the returns of a loss reduction technology.
For instance, medical treatments usually have larger returns when health losses are more consistent; while
obviously being ine⁄ective when the agent is healthy7.
Information gathering Each agent can gather information on the distribution of his individual
states by choosing one signal from the family E = f￿lg
L
l20. A signal ￿l is a random variable with ￿nite
support N = f￿1;:::;￿Ng8. For each l, pl(￿n js) represents the probability of observing ￿n, conditional
on s being the true state of the world, while pl(￿n;s) is the joint probability of the two events. Signals
are assumed to be ordered according to their Blackwell informativeness. Namely, for each pair ￿l+1 and
￿l, the matrix Pl of conditional densities of ￿l is equal to the matrix Pl+1 of conditional densities of ￿l+1
pre-multiplied by a stochastic matrix Bl; i.e. Pl+1 = BlPl. For convenience, ￿0 will denote the completely
uninformative signal such that p0(￿n js) = p0(￿n0 js) for all s; and for all pairs (￿n;￿n0).
We shall also assume that the marginal distribution of ￿, i.e. the vector gl(￿n) =
P
s pl(￿n;s),
is independent from ￿l. Finally, we impose that the distribution of conditional densities satis￿es the
monotone likelihood ratio property. Formally, for each l,
7
In the language of ￿nancial economics, a technology with increasing ￿rst di⁄erence corresponds to a speculative asset,
while one with decreasing ￿rst di⁄erences corresponds to an asset o⁄ering hedging opportunities.
8In the next sections we shall assume whenever convenient that the set of possible realization is ￿nite but arbitrarily
large. This is almost without loss of generality as conditional probabilities are not assumed to be di⁄erent for all possible




pl(￿n js + 1)
l(￿n+1 js + 1)
for all n ￿ N ￿ 1 and s ￿ S ￿ 1.
In words, individual states and realizations are a¢ liated random variables, so that the likelihood of
higher (better) realizations increases relatively more with better states.
Costs and returns of information gathering activities Information can be gathered at two
di⁄erent stages (the complete timing of agents￿actions is speci￿ed below). Either earlier information or
better information are more expensive : the cost c￿(￿l) of the signal ￿l is decreasing with respect to the
gathering stage, ￿, and increasing in the informativeness of the signal, l. Moreover, c￿(￿0) = 0 for all
￿, e.g. the uninformative signal is costless. As it has been argued by Khalil and Kremer (1992), the
assumption that earlier information is costlier is realistic in most economic applications. The extra cost
of earlier information indeed, may represent an opportunity cost (which is positive when the interest rate
is positive), or may be due to the fact that larger availability of time reduces the costs of information
gathering, possibly because some uncertainty naturally disappears as time elapses.
Information The signal gathered by an agent , its realization, and the timing of information ac-
quisition are his own private information. Signals and realizations are "hard" (trasmissible) information,
and may be voluntarily disclosed by agents who acquires them to their principals. Crucially, however,
an agent cannot prove that he has not gathered any information before a certain stage, whenever this is
the case. Moreover, agents disclosing information cannot provide veri￿able evidence of the stage in which
their information has been gathered.
Information is assumed to be transmissible in order to simplify the analysis. Assuming away voluntary
disclosure, would not change most qualitative results of the analysis (but would require the introduction
of an additional set of incentive constraints). Finally agents￿investment and consumption choices are
veri￿able and contractible.
Timing of actions Principals compete by o⁄ering exclusive contracts at the initial stage, ￿ = 0; while
agents choose which information , to gather and disclose, accept principals o⁄ers, invest and consume
according to the following timing. Either before choosing a contract, at ￿ = ￿1, or after contracting at
￿ = ￿2 agents may gather information : At ￿ = ￿ ￿; with ￿1 < ￿ ￿ < ￿2, each agent can apply for one of
the contracts o⁄ered, and can disclose the information previously acquired to his contractual counterpart;
at the same stage, applications are accepted by principals. At ￿2; agents receive funds and invest (i.e.
implement the action a); while at the ￿nal stage ￿ = ￿3, uncertainty is completely resolved, agents receive
their endowment and investment returns, contractual payments are delivered, and consumption takes
places.
Contracts Merely for simplicity, we shall impose some restrictions on the set of possible disclosure
policies. Precisely, we assume without loss of generality that any contract prescribing the agent to acquire
the signal ￿l at stage ￿ also requires that, at the same same stage, (i) the agent provides veri￿able evidence
that he has gathered ￿l; and (ii) discloses the realization of ￿l.9 .Noteworthy, the fact that information
9Considering a larger space of contracts, so as to allow principals discretion on how much information disclosure to
8can be voluntarily disclosed limits, but do not eliminate at all the e⁄ects of informational asymmetries.
Indeed, an agent who accept a contract prescribing not to gather information, neither before nor after
contracting, can violate such a prescription, by gathering any signal either at ￿1 or at ￿2, without bearing
any punishment. Similarly, an agent accepting a contract that prescribes to gather ￿l with l > 0 after
contracting, has still the opportunity to acquire ￿l before contracting, since the timing of his information
gathering activity is private information.
It is convenient to formally represent the action of not gathering any signal at a given stage as that of
gathering the costless and completely uninformative signal ￿0. Consistently, let an information gathering
plan, ￿ = (￿1;￿2), specify the signal that the agent gather at the stages ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 2. Since each agent
can gather at most one signal, ￿￿ = ￿0 for each information gathering plan such that ￿￿0
6= 0. A contract,
b = (￿;a;z), then speci￿es an information gathering plan, ￿, an N + 1 dimensional vector of actions
a = (:::a(￿n);:::), and an (N + 1) ￿ S dimensional vector of transfers to the agent z=(:::;z(￿n;s);:::).
The interpretation of a and z is the following : a(￿n) represents the action prescribed by the contract
conditional on the disclosure of ￿n, z(￿n;0) is the amount of funds the agent receives at the investment
stage conditional on ￿n, and z(￿n;s) is the ￿nal stage contingent transfer to the agent, which is conditional
on both s and ￿n. Finally, we shall assume that intermediaries o⁄er exclusive contracts. It will also be
notationally convenient, and without loss of generality to assume that intermediaries fund entirely agents￿
investments, which is they issue contracts such that a(￿n) = z(0;￿n).
Strategies Each principal can o⁄er a ￿nite menu of contracts10. A principal￿ s strategy fp = BP
is simply the choice of a ￿nite set containing m ￿ 0 of contracts. An agent￿ s strategy consists of two
sequential actions, through which he chooses (i) a signal to be gathered before contracting (possibly the
uninformative signal ￿0) and (ii) a contract in the set of principals￿o⁄ers. More formally, let B be the
set of vectors of possible o⁄ers, and de￿ne a history h observed by the agent at the contracting stage as a
set of of o⁄ers B; together with the signal ￿1
l that he has gathered before contracting and its realization
￿n. An agent strategy, fa = (f1a,f2a), then is formally de￿ned by a pair of maps f1a and f2a. The map
f1a : B ! E, associates to each possible vector of contractual o⁄ers, B 2 B; a signal, ￿l in E (possibly,
with ￿l = ￿0) that the agent gathers before contracting. The map f2a : H! B associates a contract c
contained in the set of possible vectors of o⁄ers B to each possible history h 2 H observed by the agent
at the contracting stage ￿1.
In the following we shall focus attention on pure strategy symmetric equilibria where all principals and
agents choose the same strategy; this is unrestrictive in our setting. We shall also assume that whenever
M principals o⁄er the same contract, each of them receives the same fraction of applications for that
contract.
Payo⁄s De￿ne pl(sj￿n) the probability of observing s conditional on the signal ￿l and the realization
￿n.
require, would not change the results of the analysis. Classical unraveling results show that in equilibrium all payo⁄ relevant
information will be disclosed whenever full disclosure is possible.
10This will allow to restrict attention tot symmetric equilibria.
9For any strategy pro￿le such that agents gather the signal ￿￿
l at stage ￿11, invests a(￿n) conditional












where, x(s;￿n) = ws ￿ c￿(￿l) + r(a(￿n);s) + z(￿n;s)).
Given any strategy pro￿le where agents do not gather precontractual information, an intermediary









Finally, in any strategy pro￿le where agents gather ￿l before contracting and accept the contract










A competitive equilibrium is a Bayesian perfect equilibrium of the game just described.
In the next sections, we shall characterize agents and principals equilibrium strategies and equilibrium
contracts. Preliminarily, we describe the properties of ￿rst best allocations.
3 The value of information in the ￿rst best
Information has positive operational value, to the extent that it allows to take investment decisions
better suited to the circumstances. In order to precisely de￿ne the operational value of information, let
a￿











The operational gross value of ￿l can then be formally de￿ned as the di⁄erence ￿r(￿l) = r(￿l)￿r(￿0).
While its net value is ￿r(￿l) ￿ c￿(￿l).
By the Blackwell Su¢ ciency Theorem, the gross operational value of information is increasing in l (in
the informativeness of the signal), as less noisy induce the agent to invest more (respectively, less) in states
where their technology is more (respectively, less) productive. It is also well known in the literature that
if signals and states are a¢ liated random variable (i.e. satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property),
11As we explained before, the signal gathered by the agent at stage ￿ is not necessarily the one prescribed by the contract.
10￿ra(s) = ra(a;s) ￿ ra(a;s + 1) is increasing (resp.decreasing) in s; while the optimal action a￿(￿n) is
increasing (resp. decreasing) in ￿n , (see Athey (1997) and Jewitt (1987)). Intuitively, under increasing
di⁄erences, larger values of ￿ indicates that the expected productivity of r is larger than initially assessed
, and this leads the agent to invest more. The opposite holds true under decreasing di⁄erences.
The next result, which is proved in Persico (2000) and will be used in the next sections, indicates that
information has larger operational value when optimal actions are more "risk sensitive", which is when
the schedule of actions, aFB(s) that maximize the return function r(a;s)in each state is steeper.
Proposition 1 For any pair of return functions ^ r(a;s) and ~ r(a;s) such that sign(￿^ ra(s)) = sign(￿~ ra(s))
and j￿^ r(a;s)j > j￿~ r(a;s)j, one has ^ r(￿l) > ~ r(￿l).
Intuitively, the larger are the di⁄erences
￿
￿aFB(s + 1) ￿ aFB(s)
￿
￿, the larger is the increase in the ex-
pected return that the agent obtains by gathering a signal which allows to take a better suited action (while
information has zero operational value if the optimal action is state independent : aFB(s+1)￿aFB(s) = 0).
As it was ￿rst explained by Hirshleifer (1971), a signal may also have strategic value independently
from its operational value, since it may increase agents￿expected gains from trading. The information
that the signal conveys, indeed, provides the agent the opportunity to accept a contract only when he
observe news indicating that the probability of receiving a positive transfer from the contract is su¢ ciently
large. In general, however, whether in equilibrium precontractual information has positive strategic value
for the agent depends on the set of contracts o⁄ered in the market. Moreover, if information gathering
activities are publicly observable, in order to discourage precontractual information gathering activities,
principals can o⁄er di⁄erent contracts to informed and non informed agents, and to agents who have
observed di⁄erent news before contracting. Next proposition summarizes the main properties of the
￿rst best competitive equilibrium and states that under symmetric information principals precontractual
information has never a positive strategic value, and hence is never acquired at equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If information gathering activities are publicly veri￿able, the set of competitive equilibria
coincides with that of ￿rst best allocations preferred by the agents. Moreover, in a competitive equilibrium
(i) intermediaries make zero pro￿t and o⁄er di⁄erent contracts to agents gathering information before
and after contracting, respectively; (ii) a￿
￿(￿n) maximizes the operational value of information; and (iii)
agents do not gather any signal before contracting.
The formal proof of the proposition is omitted for brevity as it relies on standard undercutting argu-
ments; we now detail informally the arguments of the proof. Under symmetric information, intermediaries￿
competitive (undercutting) behavior leads the agents to appropriate all the potential gains from trades so
that properties (i) and (ii) hold in equilibrium. Moreover there exists no equilibrium where : (I) the set
of o⁄ers includes a subset B = fbl1;:::;blNg, of contracts such that the contract bln is o⁄ered to agents who
gather ￿l and disclose both ￿l and ￿n before contracting; (II) a subset of agents gathers the signal, ￿l;
with l > 0, before contracting and sign bln when observing ￿n. Two di⁄erent arguments can alternatively
11be used to explain this result. The ￿rst is based on the fact that precontractual information is costlier.
Let denote zblm the vector of state contingent payment of the contract bln. consider now the contract ^ b,
which prescribes to gather ￿l after contracting and pays the vector zbn ￿ " conditional on observing ￿n.
Since ^ b allows to save the extra cost of precontractual information, for " su¢ ciently small, agents prefer
not to gather precontractual information and to accept ^ b, , if this contract is added to the set B of o⁄ers.
Moreover ^ b makes a pro￿t larger than bn, for all n, hence any intermediary will ￿nd it pro￿table to o⁄er
it. 12.The alternative argument that one can use for proving Proposition 2 is based on the insight that
precontractual information destroys trading opportunities. If the ￿rst best optimal allocations preferred
by the agents is not the autarky allocation, which is typically the case whenever agents are risk averse or
need funding in order to invest, gathering information before contracting prevents e¢ cient transfers across
individual states. Under competition, indeed, each of the contract o⁄ered to agents who have observed
di⁄erent news (realizations of a signal) must satisfy a zero pro￿t condition, conditional on those news,
thus preventing the equalization of marginal rates of substitution across states.13 Di⁄erently, a contract
o⁄ered to an agent who gather information after contracting must only meet the ex ante non negative
pro￿t non negative pro￿t constraint, And, hence can implement transfers across agents observing di⁄erent
news. In the absence of asymmetric information competition will lead to e¢ ciency and hence equilibrium
contracts will deter precontractual information gathering.
4 Private information and incentive compatibility
Di⁄erently than in the ￿rst best, under private information an agent who acquires the private signal
￿l before contracting can apply either for contracts which prescribe to not gather information at any
stage or for those prescribing to gather ￿l after contracting. This gives rise to a contractual externality
which is key in determining of intermediaries￿market behavior. To understand its nature, let consider
￿rst the simple case where signals have no operational value and agents do not produce. In the absence
of asymmetric information, risk-averse agents obtain in equilibrium the state independent a contract b
implementing ￿rst best allocation x(￿n;s) = ￿ x =
P
psws, for all s; , and do not gather information in
any stage. Consider now the same environment but assume that agents can gather private information




pl(sj￿n)U(ws￿c1(￿l)). Therefore, agents will ￿nd it rational to acquire precontractual
information if and only if
12A version of this argument is developped by Khalil-Kremer (1991) to prove that in a principal agent model wih asymmetric
inofrmatin agents never gather precontractual information.
13It is worth to note that under symmetric information the result that precontractual information gathering is not an
equilibrium outcome holds in a very large class of economies. Indeed, it remains valid also in settings where agents and
￿rms are heterogenous and it may be e¢ cient to acquire information before choosing the appropriate partners in production
activities. It su¢ ces that before gathering the information necessary to choose the partner, agents can sign a ￿nancial
contract, whose payo⁄s are appropriately made contingent on the information obtained Under perfect competition among














> U(￿ x) for some l > 0
For c1(￿l)) = 0 and ￿l perfectly informative, this inequality is satis￿ed since
P
s2S;
pl(sj￿n)ws > ￿ x for
all n su¢ ciently large.
In words, agents who can obtain perfect information for free will accept b only when they discover that
their endowment is low and they can receive a sure positive net payment form the contract. According to
the same logic, agents who are o⁄ered a full insurance contract prefer to acquire private information for
c1(￿l)) su¢ ciently small and ￿l su¢ ciently informative, and accept b only after observing su¢ ciently low
values of the realizations ￿n. The counterpart of this fact is that, under private access to information,
a principal o⁄ering the full insurance contract b would attract a pool of clients of worse quality (having
higher probability of facing a bad states) than under public information. In other words, access to private
information reduces the expected pro￿t they can make on the contracts they o⁄er.
More generally, agents￿incentives to gather private information before contracting depend on the fea-
tures of the whole set of contracts they can apply for. Sequentially rational principals, however, recognize
the e⁄ects of contractual externalities created by agents￿access to precontractual information and can ap-
propriately design contracts (choose their set of o⁄ers) in order to protect themselves against these e⁄ects.
By the revelation principle, the analysis of intermediaries￿ market behavior under asymmetric informa-
tion can then be simpli￿ed by assuming that only contracts satisfying appropriate incentive compatibility
conditions, which induce the agents to follow contractual prescriptions, are o⁄ered in equilibrium. In the
rest of this section, we derive these conditions.
An agent, who gathers ￿l before contracting (in the interim stage ￿ = 1) and observes ￿n; discovers
some characteristics about his true type which are summarized by the bidimensional vector (l;n) with
l ￿ 1. The set of possible interim types of the agent is then T = f:::(n;l);:::g, with n = 1;:::;N
and l = 1;:::;N: To any ￿nite set of exclusive contracts B o⁄ered in the market it corresponds a set of
allocations, X(n;ljB) that an agent with interim type (n;l) can obtain in the market either by disclosing





(x(￿n)) : 9b, such that x(s;￿n) = ws ￿ c￿(￿l) + r(s;a(￿n)) + z(s;￿n)
and ￿ = (￿l;￿0) or ￿ = (￿0;￿l)
)








Thus, a contract, b that prescribes not to gather information before contracting and implements the







g(￿n)V (X(n;ljB)) for all l
Similarly, a contract implementing x= (:::;x(￿n;s);:::), that prescribes to gather ￿^ l with ^ l > 0 after








Noteworthy, the incentive constraints de￿ned by (1) and (2) di⁄er in that (1) must hold for all l while
(2) only for l = ^ l Indeed, (1) takes into account that an agent who accepts a contract prescribing not to
gather information at any stage may have chosen any possible signal before contracting; while (2) re￿ ects
the fact that an agent who must disclose ￿l after contracting may possibly have gathered this signal, but
not anyone else, before contracting.
Let IC0(B)) and IC￿l(B)) be the set of allocations satisfying (1) and (2), respectively, when the set
of contracts B is o⁄ered in the market. The following lemma will be useful in the characterization of the
competitive equilibrium. It states that the larger is the set of contracts o⁄ered in the market, the smaller
are IC0(B)) and IC￿l(B)):
Lemma 3 For any pair B0 and B00, with B0 ￿ B00, IC￿l(B0)) ￿ IC￿l(B00)) ).
Intuitively, when a larger set of o⁄ers is available to informed agents, the ex ante option value of
private information increases and this makes incentive constraints more severe.
5 Competitive equilibria
Let xi(n;l) = (::::;xi(n;s;l);:::) 2 <S be the (interim e¢ cient) allocation most preferred by an agent with
interim type (n;l) in the set of allocations satisfying the (interim) non negative pro￿t constraint :
X
n2N;s2S
pl(sj￿n)(x(￿n;s) ￿ ws + r(a￿
l (￿n);s) ￿ c1(￿l)) = 0;
with a￿
l (￿n) = argmax
P
n2N;s2S pl(sj￿n)r(al(￿n);s) ; and de￿ne XI = f:::;xi(n;l):::g.
Since in our setting preferences are strictly convex and state independent, the interim e¢ cient alloca-
tion is such that consumption is constant across individual states, which is xi(n;;s;l) = xi(n;l). Thus,
for notational simplicity, in the following we shall omit the reference to the individual state s.
14Let ￿l be the set of allocations satisfying the ex ante non negative pro￿t constraint :
X
n2N;s2S
g(￿n)pl(sj￿n)(x(n;l) ￿ ws + r(a￿
l (￿n);s) ￿ c2(￿l)) = 0;
on agents gathering and disclosing ￿l after contracting.
Finally de￿ne bi(n;l) the contract supporting the interim e¢ cient allocation xi(n;l), with BI =
f:::;bi(n;l);:::g.
The next proposition shows that there exists a competitive equilibrium where the whole set of interim
e¢ cient zero pro￿t contracts in BI is o⁄ered in the market, together with the contract be. This contract
prescribes not to gather information before contracting, sets the e¢ cient action ae
l(￿n) = a￿
l (￿n), given
the information acquired after contracting, and maximizes the agent expected utility subject to the (ex
ante) non negative pro￿t and to the incentive constraints, where constraints take into account the fact
that all interim e¢ cient allocations are o⁄ered. In this equilibrium, all agents accept be. Finally, all
competitive equilibria in which principals do not o⁄er contracts making negative pro￿t out of equilibrium
are payo⁄ equivalent.
Proposition 4 In all competitive equilibria, agents do not gather precontractual information and choose
the vector ae
l = a￿
l of state contingent actions. Moreover, there exists a competitive equilibrium in which
agents gather, after contracting, the signal ￿e





pl(s;￿n)U(x(￿n;s)) s:t: xe 2 IC￿l(fbeg [ Bi) \ ￿￿l.
In this equilibrium a non empty subset of principals o⁄er the set Bi of contracts together with the contract
be ￿ (ze;￿e; ae




l , and ze(￿n;s) = xe(s;￿n) ￿ ws + c2(￿l) ￿ r(ae
l(￿n;s).
Finally, agents obtain the same expected utility in each equilibrium where none of the contracts o⁄ered
make negative pro￿ts if accepted.
The set BI contains all the best deals that principals can o⁄er to the agents who acquire and disclose
precontractual information. Similarly, be is the best contract that principals can o⁄er to non informed
agents; since this contract maximizes agents￿expected utility under non negative pro￿t constraint and
the incentive constraint, when the set BI of contracts is also o⁄ered. Thus, no principal can pro￿tably
deviate once be and all interim e¢ cient contracts in BI are o⁄ered, neither by attracting informed nor
non informed agents. Essentially, interim e¢ cient contracts de￿ne the set of competitive threats of being
cream-skimmed for the intermediaries who o⁄er contracts to non informed agents. These threats determine
the fraction of potential gains from trading that agents and principals can exploit in equilibrium.
Uniqueness also results from competition : competitive pressures lead principals to o⁄er either to
informed or to uninformed agents the contracts they prefer in the set satisfying the non negative pro￿t
and the incentive constraints. Competitive equilibria must be robust to the introduction of interim e¢ cient
15contracts (incentive compatible). This is because in equilibrium all contracts prescribing precontractual
information, which make positive pro￿ts and are accepted by some agent if o⁄ered, must be o⁄ered by
some competing principal.
The equilibrium feature that some contracts are o⁄ered but not accepted by any agent is a by-product
of Bertrand-like undercutting behavior in several standard settings, and needs not be taken literally. In
our set-up, this result rests upon the speci￿c contracting assumptions we imposed in order to simplify
the description of the game. It is possible to show that if one allows both principals and agents to
make contractual proposals, the equilibrium allocation remains the same described above; but it can
be supported by intermediaries￿ strategies such that no contract which is not accepted is o⁄ered in
equilibrium.In addition, focusing attention on equilibria in which contracts making negative pro￿t are not
o⁄ered seems realistic and can be formally justi￿ed by a trembling hand argument.
Finally, Corollary 3 and Proposition 4 imply that competitive equilibria are not second best. In
particular, let L(l0) = l for ￿l > ￿0; L(l0) = L for ￿l = ￿0, and ￿c(￿l0) = c1(￿l0) ￿ c2(￿l), the set of














pl(s;￿n)U(x(￿n;s)) ￿ 0 .
and the feasibility constraint :
X
n2N;s2S
g(￿n)pl(sj￿n)(x(n;l) ￿ ws + r(a￿


















by risk aversion, competition makes incentive constraints more stringent.
Throughout, we shall focus on equilibrium contract. The reader can easily verify that all the charac-
terization results stated in the following sections hold also in the second best.
6 Equilibrium payments￿schemes and information gathering choices
Throughout this section we shall investigate the properties of the equilibrium payments￿scheme received
by the agent and his information gathering choices.
















where L(l0) = l for ￿l > ￿0; L(l0) = L for ￿l = ￿0. and ￿c(￿l0) = c1(￿l0) ￿ c2(￿l)14.
The left-hand-side of this inequality represents the agent￿ s option value of acquiring precontractual
information. For simplicity, we shall assume in the following that there exists an unique signal ￿l0 = ￿lo
maximizing this value. Let xi(lo); be the allocation such that an agent agent gathering ￿lo receives his
interim e¢ cient consumption xi(n;lo) contingent on each possible ￿n:
To begin understanding the properties of incentive compatible allocations, note that, since ￿c(￿l) > 0
for all l; any allocation in a su¢ ciently small neighborhood of xi(lo); is incentive compatible; while only
allocations belonging to a small neighborhood of xi(lo) satisfy the incentive constraint for small values of
￿c(￿l).
Consider now the ￿rst best allocation, xFB; which is constant across states and signals realizations
because of agents￿risk aversion. As one can readily verify, the option value of precontractual information
is negative in xFB, if and only if the extra cost, of precontractual information ￿c(￿l) is larger than a
threshold value ￿c(￿l) > 0 for all l. In the following, we shall study the more interesting class of situations
where ￿c(￿l) < ￿c(￿l): In this case, satisfying incentive conditions requires agents to consume more in
states in which their produced and non produced wealth is relatively larger, or equivalently, transfers
across states to be rationed (smaller than in the ￿rst best). To explain why, it is useful to consider the
option value of the signal ￿lo as an average re￿ ecting gains and losses that an agent gathering ￿lo before
contracting makes, after observing good and bad news, respectively. Precisely, in our environment good
news corresponds to realizations of ￿lo belonging to the subset ￿1 such that the (expected) produced
and non produced wealth conditional on ￿n; equal to xi(n;lo), is larger than xFB for all ￿n in ￿1. While
bad news corresponds to realizations of ￿lo belonging to the subset ￿2 such that xi(n;lo) < xFB for all
￿n in ￿2. Consider now a situation where principals o⁄er interim e¢ cient contracts to informed agents
and the a contract implementing the allocation x = (:::;x(￿n;s);:::) and prescribes to gather ￿l after
contracting. Conditional on gathering ￿lo and observing ￿n 2 ￿1; the agent prefers to disclose at the
contracting stage his information and apply for the interim e¢ cient contract which guarantees either non
negative expected transfers or allocative e¢ ciency conditional on ￿n . Thus, his utility gain conditional








14Note that ￿c(￿l0) = c1(￿l0) ￿ c2(￿l) is equal to c1(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) for l > 0 while it is equal to c1(￿l
0) for l = 0.
17On the contrary, an agent who gathers ￿lo, and observes bad news, ends up by choosing the same
contract that an uninformed agent would choose, as this allows him to obtain a positive transfer. Hence,
conditional on bad news (on ￿n 2 ￿2), his investment in information yields an utility loss, since earlier







plo(sj￿n)(U(x(￿n;s) ￿ (U(x(￿n;s) ￿ ￿c(￿lo)] < 0:
As next proposition will show, whenever G(lo) + L(lo) > 0 in the ￿rst best, then the equilibrium
expected consumption conditional on good news must be larger than in the ￿rst best (e.g., transfers
from good to bad states must be reduced), in order to satisfy incentive conditions. Intuitively, this is true
because G(lo) is increasing in the di⁄erence between the expected produced and non produced wealth that









Hence, reducing consumption conditional on good news reduces the gains from precontractual information.
More precisely, the equilibrium payment scheme of the agent is designed by competing intermediaries
to deter precontractual information, by imposing the minimal welfare cos to the agent at the same time.
In particular, the next proposition proves that the minimization of second best losses will lead principals
either to ration agents￿ transfers towards the contingencies where bad news are observed or to o⁄er
consumption schedules which depend on the news that the agent acquires after contracting. Remarkably
the equilibrium contract has also very simple properties, as it induces a completely ￿ at consumption for
all values of s and ￿n such that the agent receives a positive transfers in equilibrium, and at most two
di⁄erent values of contingent consumptions conditional on receiving a negative transfer. In addition, if
the extra cost of earlier information is not too large or risk aversion is not "too decreasing with wealth",
agents obtain a completely ￿ at consumption schedule also for all "contingencies" (￿n;s) in which their
transfer is negative.
Denote ￿(x) = @(u00(x)=u0(x))@x the ￿rst derivative of the agents￿Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index.
Proposition 5 whenever ￿l > ￿0 in equilibrium, the equilibrium allocation xe is such x((￿n;s) = ￿ x for
all (￿n;s) such that z(￿n;s) > 0. Moreover￿ the agent￿ s consumption schedule satis￿es the following
properties (i) x(￿n;s) ￿ x(￿n0;s0) whenever s ￿ s0; (ii) for all (￿n;￿l) such that z(￿n;s) < 0, there exist
at most two di⁄erent values ~ x and x with ￿ x > ~ x ￿ x and an individual state ~ s such that x(￿n;s) = ~ x for
all s ￿ ~ s and x(￿n;s) = x for all s < ~ s;(iii) ￿nally, ~ x = x whenever ￿(x) > ￿k with 0 < k < ￿ k, for
some positive ￿ k, or ￿c(￿l) su¢ ciently small.
Providing a sure consumption ￿ x for all ￿n 2 ￿1 lessens second best losses and improves incentives
at the same time. In particular, a sure consumption reduces the expected utility gains agents obtain
by accepting, after having gathered information and observed a particular realization, the corresponding
interim e¢ cient contract. Indeed, by risk aversion, lower consumption variability conditional on good
news increases the utility that risk averse agents obtains within the contract .
18A similar logic explains why x(￿n;s) =x for all ￿n 2 ￿2, whenever ￿c is su¢ ciently small or ￿(x)
is not too negative:If ￿(x) is su¢ ciently large, however, increasing the variability of agents￿consumption
conditional on ￿0
n 2 ￿2 may increase the loss that an agent bears when he gathers precontractual informa-
tion, and observes bad news. Such a loss is indeed proportional to the agent￿ s variability of consumption
conditional on ￿n 2 ￿2 whenever risk aversionis decreasing with wealth, and gets larger for larger values
of the prudence index.
Finally a interesting feature of the equilibrium contracts characterized in the previous proposition is
that they seem largely consistent with real world contracts. For instance, in an insurance context, an
equilibrium contract can be easily interpreted as one with ￿xed deductible and maximal reimbursement.
Equilibrium information gathering choices
We now investigate the determinants of information acquisition choices, and compare private and social
incentives to gather information. We shall show that in equilibrium agents always acquire information if
the cost of precontractual information gathering is not too large for at least one of the available signals.
Importantly, this remains true even if some or all signals have a negative net operational value (though this
value cannot be too small), provided that a perfectly informative signal does not exist, or it is su¢ ciently
costly. In such a case, information gathering costs paid by the agents in equilibrium results in a pure
waste from a social (￿rst best) point of view.
Proposition 6 Assume that the most informative signal ￿L is either su¢ ciently costly or not perfectly
informative. In equilibrium, information gathering choices satisfy the following properties : (i) there exists
a real positive number c2 such that if c2(￿l) c2(￿l) < c2, the agent gathers ￿e
l, with l ￿ 1 in equilibrium; (ii)
Assume ￿c(￿l0) su¢ ciently small for all l. There exists a a positive and decreasing function kl(￿c(￿l0)),
such that if r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) > ￿kl(￿c(￿l0)), for all l, the agent gathers ￿e
l, with l ￿ 1 in equilibrium; (iii)
no information is gathered in equilibrium if r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) < 0 for all l > 0, and there exists ￿ su¢ ciently
small such that, for each ￿n; pl(s=￿n) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ for some s.
Notably, these ￿ndings contrasts with the seminal contribution Khalil-Kremer (1991). who introduced
the issue of the optimal timing of information gathering within a principal-agent problem where only a
perfectly informative costly signal is available to the agents and information is not trasmissible. Within
this setting, these authors proved that socially wasteful information is never gathered in equilibrium.
Proposition 6 implies that this result does not generalize to the case where agents can choose between
signals of di⁄erent quality, or a perfectly informative signal is simply not available, and agents can
voluntarily disclose the information they gather.15. The main insight behind this result is that acquiring
15For the sake of brevity, we only formally prove that that these properties holds in the competitive equilibrium, but
exactly the same argument developed in proposition 6 can be applied to show that the same results extend to second best
allocations where a single principal can choose the number of contracts o⁄ered.Moreover, one can easily check that the results
in proposition 6 remain true if agents cannot disclose the information they gather.
19and disclosing after contracting information with negative net operational value, while reducing agents
expected consumption, makes it easier to deter agents from gathering precontractual information, i.e. it
relaxes the incentive constraint. Information disclosure allows to design more powerful incentive schemes,
by o⁄ering the agent a payment schedule contingent not only on the realization of individual states
but also on the news that an agent would observe should he decide to gather precontractual information.
Indeed, a contract that prescribes not to gather information neither before nor after trading can only ration
transfers across di⁄erent individual states in order to satisfy incentive constraints (to deter precontractual
information gathering). Di⁄erently, in order to obtain the same objective, a contract which imposes to
gather information and disclose information after contracting can also use this information to implement
transfers across interim types, e.g. across agents disclosing di⁄erent news.
As we showed in Proposition 5, making agents￿payments dependent on the news they disclose after
contracting allows to reduce second best losses. Proposition 6 demonstrates that this reduction may well
overtake the loss of consumption that an agent bears when he gathers a signal with negative operational
value. In particular, this is always the case when the (extra) cost of precontractual information is
su¢ ciently small. In this case, indeed, a contract that prescribes not to gather precontractual information
must necessarily implement very small transfers across states in order to satisfy incentive compatibility.
Agents accepting such a contract will thus obtain an utility close to that associated to their autarky
allocation. On the other hand, a contract prescribing to gather ￿l after contracting yields to the agent
an utility larger than that he obtains by gathering the same signal before contracting and accepting
the interim e⁄cient contract bi(l;n) whenever observing ￿n. If ￿l is not perfectly informative and has a
negative but not too small operational value , agents will then acquire information in equilibrium since
the expected utility risk averse agents obtain by consuming xi(l;n) for each possible ￿n is larger than
that they can achieve by consuming their autarky allocation .
A particularly striking example of a situation where acquiring socially wasteful information turns
out to be welfare increasing is that where all available signals have either a negligible informational
content, or a slightly negative net value , while cl + ￿c(￿l) is su¢ ciently small for all l. In this case,
indeed, for all l > 0 there exists an incentive compatible contract prescribing the agent to gather ￿l after
contracting, which makes non negative pro￿t and allows the agent to obtain an expected utility close
to that he would obtain in a competitive ￿rst best environment. This is simply all zero pro￿t interim
e¢ cient allocations gets close to the ￿rst best allocation preferred by the agent when the informational
content of the signals becomes negligible. On the other hand, any contract which induces the agent not to
gather information must implement an allocation close to autarky when ￿c(￿l) becomes negligible. Thuhe
feasible contract maximizing agents￿expected utility clearly prescribes socially wasteful information to
be gathered in equilibrium. Di⁄erently, whenever all available signals are very informative, it becomes
approximately equivalent, in terms of the agent￿ s incentives, to condition payments on signals￿realizations
or on individual states. For this reason, the acquisition of information with negative net value is never
imposed in equilibrium.
Finally, the result that socially useless information may be gathered in equilibrium is consistent with
20what we often observe, for instance, in real health insurance markets Contractual forms which are wide-
spread in these markets indeed often require agents to periodically undertake , after contracting, medical
tests with negative net operational value and are simply aimed to obtain better information on the agent￿ s
prospective health. Moreover, these contracts contain clauses which impose to revise insurance premium
according to the results of the tests. Our results shows that these apparently puzzling features of real con-
tracts can be naturally explained in terms of the advantages of discouraging precontractual information
acquisition.
The next corollary immediately follows from propositions 1 and 6.
Corollary 7 If (ra(a;s) ￿ ra(a;s0))=c(￿1) + ￿c(￿1) is su¢ ciently small for all s and s0, ￿1 is not per-
fectly informative and c(￿1) + ￿c is also su¢ ciently small, agents overinvest in information gathering in
equilibrium.
In the following we shall investigates the determinants of information gathering decisions and compare
social and private incentives to gather information in the case where information has a positive net
operational (social) value. We begin by proving a result that will play a crucial role in the rest of the
section. In particular, we will show that under mild assumptions, the expected wealth of the agent
conditional on observing a realization larger or equal than any threshold level ￿￿ n; with ￿ n > 1; is larger
(resp. smaller) under more (resp. less) informative signals.
Let I(￿n;s) = ws + r(a￿
l (￿n);s), and de￿ne






with P(￿ n) =
P
s;n￿n pl(sm;￿n), the agent￿ s expected wealth conditional on gathering ￿l and observing
a realization larger or equal than ￿￿ n:
Lemma 8 EI(￿n ￿ ￿￿ n
￿
￿￿l+1) > EI(￿n ￿ ￿￿ n j￿l) for all l and for all ￿ n > 1. Moreover, there exists a
strictly positive vector ￿ 2 <S such that EI(￿n ￿ ￿ ￿n
￿
￿￿l+1)￿I(￿n ￿ ￿ ￿n j￿l) >
P
s ￿s[Is￿Is￿1] for all s.
To clarify the economic intuition behind this result, consider the binary case where each signal has
only two possible realizations, ￿1 and ￿2, and there exist only two individual states, s1 and s2, for each
agent. Knowing that signals and states are positively correlated an agent observing the realization ￿2
can update his beliefs, so that by the Bayes rule pl(￿2 js2) > p2: Moreover, the more informative is the
signal the agent has gathered, the more con￿dent he will be that the true state of nature is s2 after having
observed ￿2. Hence, Blackwell su¢ ciency, together with the assumptions of a¢ liation of individual states
and signals, imply pl+1(s2 j￿2) > pl(s2 j￿2) > p2:As a consequence, the agent expected wealth conditional
on ￿ = ￿2 increases with l. Lemma 8 proves that this result generalizes to the case of many states and
21many signals￿realizations. The lemma also states that the increase in expected wealth becomes more
important when the slope of the state contingent wealth schedule ws + r(a￿
l (￿n);s) gets larger.
By taking advantage of the previous lemma, we shall now compare the set of incentive compatible
allocations corresponding to di⁄erent information gathering choices and subsequently characterize equilib-
rium information gathering choices.For simplicity we shall assume that the numer of signals is su¢ ciently
large, so that for any ￿l there exists ￿l0 less informative than ￿l, such that jpl0(sj￿n) ￿ pl(sj￿n)j < ￿;
and jc2(￿l0) ￿ c2(￿l)j < " , with ￿ and " su¢ ciently small, Speci￿cally, next proposition proves that in-
centive compatibility constraints associated to more informative signals are more stringent, provided that
ws+r(a￿
l (￿n);s) is su¢ ciently increasing in s. Intuitively, this is because, by the previous lemma, a more
informative signal gathered before contracting allows the agent to obtain in the market a larger consump-
tion than a less informative one conditional on discovering good news. Since the expected net gains from
precontractual information are proportional to the expected consumption that the agent can obtain in
the market under good news, acquiring information before contracting is more tempting for an agent who
is o⁄ered a contract prescribing ￿l, than for one who is prescribed to gather the less informatve signal
￿l￿k:And hence ensuring incentive compatibility when agents are required to disclose more informative
news also requires to ration more severely their trades.
Proposition 9 If each signal has only two possible realizations, or I(￿n;s)￿I(￿n;s￿1)=(ju00(x)=u0(x)j) >
D, with D su¢ ciently large for all possible x and s. For all l > 0; and for any xl(￿n;s) 2 IC￿l,
there exists ^ xl￿1(￿n;s) 2 IC￿l￿1 such that E￿lu(xl(￿n;s)) < E￿l￿1u(^ xl￿1(￿n;s)) and E￿lxl(￿n;s) =
E￿l￿1(^ xl￿1(￿n;s)).
The reason why the statement of the proposition requires Is￿Is￿1 to be su¢ ciently large relatively to
the agents￿Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index is the following. One cannot exclude a priori that gathering
a more informative signal before contracting increases either the expected value or the riskiness of the
distribution of consumption that the agent can obtain in the market conditional on observing a realization
better than any given ￿n before contracting. When this happens, the former e⁄ect makes the option
value of more informative signals larger , and hence incentive constraints associated to these signals
more stringent, while the latter e⁄ect goes in the opposite direction. By the previous lemma, Is ￿ Is￿1
su¢ ciently large for all s with respect to the risk aversion index ensures that the forme e⁄ect prevails.
Let ￿FB be the signal gathered by agents in the ￿rst best regime where information gathering activities
are fully observable and contractible. Next proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for agents to under-
invest in information gathering in equilibrium. Precisely, it shows that in the competitive equilibrium
agents gather less information than in the ￿rst best, whenever a non empty subset of signals has positive
net value, provided ws + r(a￿
l (￿n);s) is su¢ ciently increasing in s or the agent￿ s risk aversion is not too
large.
Proposition 10 Assume that each signal has only two possible realizations, or I(￿n;s) ￿ I(￿n;s ￿
1)=(ju00(x)=u0(x)j) > D, with D su¢ ciently large for all possible x and s, then ￿e
l < ￿FB.
22This ￿nding, which is in contrast with all the received literature, follows from the fact that incentive
constraints associated to less informative signals are less stringent. Indeed, this incentive e⁄ect gives rise
to a key second best trade-o⁄. On the one hand, by proposition 8, a contract prescribing to gather a
signal less informative than the ￿rst best one, ￿FB
l ; allows the agent to obtain a less distorted allocation
than the one he would obtain under ￿FB
l . On the other hand, gathering a signal less informative than
￿FB
l reduces the expected consumption of the agent. The consumption loss due to the choice of a signal
￿l less informative ￿FB
l , however, becomes of second order when the informativeness of the signal that the
agent gathers is only slightly reduced. As a consequence, the incentive e⁄ect dominates the wealth e⁄ect
for small distortions of the signal. In equilibrium, this induces competing principals to o⁄er a contract
that prescribes to gather a signal less informative than ￿FB
l . In other words, the e⁄ects of the negative
externality created by precontractual information acquisition get larger for more informative signals.
As under competition these e⁄ects ultimately reduce agents expected utility, in equilibrium competing
principals issue contracts requiring less information to be gathered after contracting so as to o⁄er better
deals to the agents.
7 Opting-out opportunities and multiple consumption dates
For the sake of parsimony, in the previous sections we restricted attention to an environment where agents
consume in a single period. More importantly, did not take into account the possibility that agents opt-out
from a contract after having observed payo⁄ relevant news, nor we investigated the e⁄ects of opting-out
opportunities on prvate incentives to gather private information.
In real insurance and credit markets, agents often sign multi-period contracts which allows them to opt-
out after one or more periods, possibly at some cost. Both practitioners and economists have emphasized
that, while long term-commitment is often impossible or too costly to enforce, opting- out opportunities
may lower the pro￿tability of intermediation activities in insurance and credit markets, and may reduce
risk-sharing and consumption smoothing opportunities. For instance in competitive markets, discovering
good news on their prospective health o⁄er individuals the opportunity to change insurance company if
their premiums are not lowered. But, if low-risk individuals opt-out from contracts o⁄ering rates which
are fair given initial priors, these contracts become unpro￿table. There exists a large economic literature,
studying the e⁄ects of the unenforceability of long term contracts, in environments where payo⁄ relevant
information is revealed to the parties in a contract as time elapses. Opportunities of earlier termination of
a long term contract, however, a⁄ect also the agents￿incentives to gather costly private information after
entering the contract, since this information can be used to better evaluate the consequences of opting-out
decisions.
The main objective of this section is to show that all the main results of the paper continue to hold
in settings where agents can use private information to exploit opting out opportunities in the absence of
long term commitment .More precisely, we shall show that private incentives to gather information fall
short of (respectively exceed) social incentives under the same conditions, either in environments where
23long term contracts are enforceable but agents may gather private information before contracting or in
those where information can be gathered only after contracting but agents can opt-out from the contract
after having gathered information. To begin understanding this poi,nt consider a modi￿ed version of the
game studied in the previous section where :
￿ Intermediaries o⁄ering contracts designed to attract non informed agents can require their contractual
parties to sign these contracts at the initial stage ￿ = 0 (e.g., before the information gathering stages ￿1
and ￿2.)
￿ Agents who have accepted a contract at ￿ = 0 can opt out from this contract at ￿ = ￿1, and sign at
that stage a new contract which prescribes to gather and disclose information before contracting.
In fact it is straightforward to verify that this game has the same set of equilibrium payo⁄s as the
one analyzed in the previous section have exactly . This is just because, a strategy prescribing to sign
a contract before gathering information, and to choose after having gathered information whether to
opt-out from this contract is equivalent, from the point of view of the agent, to gather information before
contracting and decide subsequently which contract to accept. In other words, having access to private
information after contracting, instead of before, does not impose any additional constraint to the agent,
in the absence of "long term commitment".
The game satisfying the two assumptions above, however, while capturing the essential aspects of the
information gathering problem in the presence of opting-out opportunities, exhibits a somewhat awkward
feature: termination decisions by agents take place before any payment of that contract has been delivered
and agents have undertaken any production or consumption activity. In fact, in most situations where
those opportunities are relevant, an agent￿ s usual course of actions is such that, after having signed a
contract, he follows contractual prescriptions, receives (or makes) payments and undertake consumption
and production activities for some periods, after which he starts considering early exit options. Usually,
this is just because agents receive news or, equivalently the cost of gathering news drops, as time goes by.
As a consequence, it is natural to wonder whether the homeomorphism stressed above continue to hold
in the presence of multiple consumption dates. In fact it is quite straightforward to verify that all the
main results of the previous sections generalize to a setting with multiple consumption dates where long
term contracts are enforceable and agents can gather pre-contractual information. Throughout the rest of
the section, we investigate how the presence of multiple consumption dates and opting-out opportunities
a⁄ect equilibrium information gathering strategies and contracts.
Consider an environment where risk-averse agents receive a positive random endowment and consume
in two dates : either at the investment stage ￿ = ￿1, or in a ￿nal stage ￿ = ￿3. Denote (w￿1;:::;,w￿S;
p￿1;:::;p￿S) the period ￿ distribution of the agent￿ s endowment, and x￿ =(x￿1;:::;x￿S) the period ￿ state
contingent consumption, with x = (x￿2;x￿3). To minimize the di⁄erences with the environment studied
in the previous sections, we shall assume that agents receive returns in the ￿nal stage ￿ = ￿3 only, and can
gather information in two di⁄erent stages as before. Moreover, signals provide information only on the
individual states of the ￿nal stage (exactly as in the previous section), while the return function r and the
set of signals also satisfy the same properties as in the previous sections. Intermediaries can o⁄er either
24two-periods ("long term") contracts, which transfer resources across period and states, or one period
contracts which prescribe to gather and disclose information, which transfer resources only across period
￿ = 1 consumption states. Within this setting, the key assumptions will be that agents can sign a long
term contract only at the initial stage, e.g., before gathering information; while, at a lsubsequent stage
they decide whether to opt-out from their long term contract and accept a new contract which requires
to gather and disclose information . A long term contract b = (z;￿;a) pays o⁄ in both the consumption
dates, so that z = (z￿2(s);z1(￿n;s)); di⁄erently a short term contract, b = (z￿2;￿;a) contains presciptions
on investment and on the agent information gathering policy same but transfers resources only across
states of the ￿nal period.
The precise timing of actions is now as follows. At the initial stage, ￿ = 0, principals o⁄er either two
periods contracts designed to attract uninformed agents or one period contracts which pay o⁄ only in the
second consumption date; agents can accept long term contracts only at this stage. Information can be
gathered by the agents either at ￿ = ￿1, or at ￿ = ￿2 with ￿1 < ￿2. At ￿ = ￿ ￿; with ￿1 < ￿ ￿ < ￿2, an agent
can opt out from long term contract and apply for a short term contract; at this stage he can also disclose
the information previously acquired to his contractual counterpart. At ￿2; applications for short term
contracts are accepted, and agents receive funds and invest; while at the ￿nal stage ￿ = ￿3, uncertainty
is completely resolved, agents receive their endowment and investment returns, and contracts pay o⁄.
To each agent strategy, it corresponds a particular agents state contingent allocation x which yields








Similarly to the single consumption date set-up, in order to characterize competitive equilibria one
need to de￿ne the second period interim e¢ cient allocations that competing principals can o⁄er to agents
disclosing information. Let xi￿3(n;l) be the allocation preferred by the agents in the set de￿ned by the
the stage ￿3 non negative pro￿t constraint :
X
n2N;s2S
pl(sj￿n)(x￿3(￿n;s) ￿ ws + r(a￿
l (￿n);s) ￿ c1(￿l)) = 0
Let Bi the set of interim e¢ cient contract . If all these contracts are o⁄ered at the initial stage,
an agent who accepts the long term contract b implementing the allocation x = (x￿1;x￿3), gathers
information at ￿1; and decides whether to opt-out from this contract at this stage, obtains the expected



















25with L(l0) = l if ￿l > ￿0 and L(l0) = L if ￿l > ￿0. Thus if all interim e¢ cient contracts are o⁄eerred, a
contract that prescribes not to gather information at ￿ = ￿1 and implements the allocation x is incentive
compatible if and and only if E￿lu(x;xi￿3) ￿ E￿lu(x). By using the argument employed ￿rst by Khalil
and Kremer, that we exploited to characterize the competitive equilibria of the single consumption date
environment, one then shows that agents never gather information at ￿ = ￿1; since earlier information
is costlier and paying agents more conditional on good news (on high realizations of ￿n) always relaxes
incentives. Precisely, it is straightforward to verify that these two facts have the following implication.
For any strategy pro￿le such that agents accept in the initial period the contract b, which in the absence
of early termination would implement the allocation x, is such that E￿lu(x;xi￿3) > E￿lu(x), and makes
non negative pro￿t, there exists another contract b0 which makes non negative pro￿ts and implements x0
such that E￿lu(x;xi￿3) < E￿lu(x0) and E￿lu(x0;xi￿3) < E￿lu(x0).
Then, by the same logic used in the previous sections, it follows that in equilibrium agents never opt-
out from the contract they sign in the ￿rst period, and the competitive equilibrium allocations maximize
the agent expected utility under the ex ante non negative pro￿t constraint and the incentive compatibility
constraint. Nevertheless, opting out opportunities not only make ￿rst best allocations not incentive com-
patible, but also lead to suboptimal information acquisition choices. Indeed, equilibrium distortions in
information gathering activities remain qualitatively the same described in the previous sections. Specif-
ically, this is for the following reason. The characterization of agents￿information gathering decisions
presented in the previous sections relies only upon the following key properties of the set of incentive
compatible allocations :
(P1) If c2(￿l) or ￿c(￿l) are su¢ ciently small for all l, and r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) > ￿k(￿c(￿l0)), with
k(￿c(￿l0)) > 0 and su¢ ciently small for all l, there exists an incentive compatible allocation b which
prescribe to gather information after contracting which is preferred to any incentive compatible contract
prescribing not to gather information at any stage.
(P2) If I(￿n;s) ￿ I(￿n;s ￿ 1)=(ju00(x)=u0(x)j) > D, with D su¢ ciently large for all possible x and s,
then or all l > 0; and for any xl(￿n;s) 2 IC￿l, there exists ^ xl￿1(￿n;s) 2 IC￿l￿1 such that E￿lu(xl(￿n;s)) <
E￿l￿1u(^ xl￿1(￿n;s)) and E￿lxl(￿n;s) = E￿l￿1(^ xl￿1(￿n;s)).
By following exactly the same arguments developped in the proofs of Proposition 6, Lemma 8 allows
to show that either (P1) or (P2) continue to hold in the presence of multiple consumption periods,
provided that r(￿l) and I(￿n;s) are suitably reinterpreted as expected returns and contingent wealth in
￿3, respectively. This, in turn, leads to establish that the statement of Proposition 6 and 9 continue to
hold true in the presence of opting out opportunities. Namely, agents overinvest in information gathering
if information has negative operational value, asnd its cost is not too large, while they often underinvest
in information when they have access to signals with positive operational value.
268 Concluding remarks
Information acquisition may have double edged welfare consequences, and private and social incentives to
acquire information often do not coincide. Gathering public information may generate positive externali-
ties whenever information has operational value for many agents, as it is typically case for innovative ideas
(Arrow (1971)) On the other hand, since private information reduces the set of mutually pro￿table trades
that two parties can conclude in the market, a negative contractual externality arises whenever an agent
can acquire private information on some payo⁄ relevant variable, before deciding whether to enter in a
contract, . According to a well established conventional wisdom, this negative contractual externalities
may often lead agents to under-invest in information, at least whenever a su¢ ciently large part of the
news gathered by each of them can be kept private. Under private information, however, the design of
appropriate incentive schemes aimed at deterring opportunistic behavior starts to play a central role and,
we argue, the Pigouvian logic assuming "action taking behavior" may not be appropriate to investigate
the e⁄ects of negative contractual externalities. Speci￿cally, this paper characterizes competitive equilib-
rium outcomes and investigates the properties of these schemes under the assumptions that agents may
gather information either before or after contracting. We show that equilibrium contracts, appropriately
designed to "minimize" the negative welfare of negative contractual externalities, often lead agents to
underinvest in private information gathering activities, provided the informational value of information
is not too small. The opposite, result, however may hold true when the quality of the signals available
to the agents is relatively low and these signals have a net negative operational value. Both these results
contrasts with the received literature.
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pl(sj￿n)U(x(￿n;s)) ￿ V (X(n;l
￿
￿B00)
where V (X(n;ljB00) =
P
s maxx2X(n;ljB00 ) pl(sj￿n)U(x(￿n;s)):
Proof of proposition 4 To prove that in equilibrium agents do not gather any signal before con-
tracting, one can follow exactly the same lines of the proof of Khalil-Kremer (1992), for this reason the
formal proof of this fact is omitted. It is also immediate to verify that IC￿l(Be) is non empty whenever
c2(￿l) < c1(￿l).Consider now an incentive compatible contract b
0
￿ (z;￿; al 6= a￿
l ) with al 6= a￿
l . Since
investment is publicly veri￿able and does not enter the incentive constraints, there always exists another
contract b00=( z;￿;a￿
l ) that yields the same utility as b0 to the agents and an higher pro￿t to the principal.
Second, the continuity of the agent￿ s utility function implies that there exists a small vector " such that
b00 =( z +";￿;a￿
l ) is preferred by both the agent and the principal to b. Any principal can thus pro￿tably
deviate from an equilibrium candidate in which agents accept b
0
by o⁄ering b00.We now show that there
exists a Bayesian perfect equilibrium where all principals o⁄er the set Bi [ be of contracts while agents
accept be. This amounts to prove that that there exists no o⁄er b0 whose associated allocation x0 belongs




) \ ￿￿l0.and is strictly preferred by the agents to xe:The proof is by contradiction.








)\￿￿l0 But, in turn, x0 preferred
to xe implies that xe cannot solve program (3).The proof that the agent obtains the same expected utility
in all equilibria, provided that none of the contracts o⁄ered makes negative pro￿ts if accepted, is done
by contradiction as well, and is divided in two parts. First, we show that in equilibrium agents cannot
obtain an utility larger than that provided by be. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium where the set









ple(s;￿n)U(xe(￿n;s)). Since xe solves the equilibrium program
in (3), Lemma 1 implies that a subset of interim e¢ cient contracts is not o⁄ered in this equilibrium. Now







such that for each l and n, b
00
nl prescribes to gather
￿l and disclose ￿l and ￿n before contracting, implements a￿
l (￿n), and the allocation x
00
nl = xi(n;l) ￿ ";









This inequality together with the de￿nition of B00 implies that, given any equilibrium candidate where the
agent obtains an allocation preferred to xe, there exists a set of contracts which prescribe to gather pre-
contractual information, would be accepted by the agents if o⁄ered, and, make positive pro￿ts if accepted.
28Whenever the number of principals is large, at least one of them can pro￿tably deviate from the equilib-
rium candidate by o⁄ering those contracts.Assume now that there exists an equilibrium where the set of
contracts ^ B is o⁄ered, while the agent accepts ^ b 2 ^ B, gathers the signal ￿^ l after contracting, and consumes
the allocation ^ x such that
P
s;n
p^ l(s;￿n)U(^ x(￿n;s)) <
P
s;n
ple(s;￿n)U(xe(￿n;s)). Since ^ x(￿n;s) is not a ￿rst
best allocation, the incentive compatibility condition
P
n g(￿n)V (X(n;^ l
￿




must hold as equality in equilibrium. Suppose now that all contracts in ^ B=^ b make non negative pro￿ts if















But then the continuity of the utility function U implies that there exists a contract b0 = (z0;a￿
l (￿n);￿e
l),
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￿ ￿




[ fb0g). As a consequence, ^ B must necessarily contain a contract which
prescribes to gather precontractual information and makes negative pro￿t if accepted. Were this not true,
some principal could pro￿tably deviate from the equilibrium candidate by o⁄ering a contract which allows
the agent to consume the allocation xe ￿ ".
Proof of proposition 5 After straightforward algebraic manipulations, the ￿rst order conditions of
the equilibrium program for the case where ￿l > ￿0 can be rewritten as
Ux(x(￿n;s)) = ￿ for all (￿n;s) such that z(￿n;s) > 0
and
Ux(x(￿n;s) ￿ ￿lUx(x(￿n;s) ￿ ￿c(￿l)) = ￿ for all (￿n;s) such that z(￿n;s) < 0
where ￿ and ￿l are, respectively, the Lagrangian multipliers associated to the non negative pro￿t and
the incentive constraints of the equilibrium program. From these conditions, it follows that, if ￿e
l is such
that l ￿ 1, x(￿n;s) is constant for all (￿n;s) such that z(￿n;s) > 0. The conditions above also imply
x(￿n;s) > x(￿n0;s0) for any pair of vectors (￿n;s) and (￿n0;s0) such that z(￿n;s) > 0; and (￿n0;s0) such
that z(￿n0;s0) < 0 .
Moreover the derivative of the function G(x(￿n;s)) = Ux(x(￿n;s) ￿ ￿lUx(x(￿n;s) ￿ ￿c(￿l)) may
change sign at most once, given the strict concavity of U, Hence there exists at most two values ~ x and
x of x(￿n;s) satisfying G(x(￿n;s)) = 0. Finally, the derivative of the function Gx(x(￿n;s)) is strictly
positive if ￿(x) > ￿k or ￿c < ￿, with ￿ su¢ ciently small. Hence, in this case, ~ x = x.￿
Proof of proposition 6 Consider the more constrained version, of the equilibrium program (3)
in which the additional constraint ￿l = ^ ￿l is imposed. Let denote ^ V (c2(^ ￿l)) the value function of this
program parametrized by the cost c2(^ ￿l) of acquiring ^ ￿l after contracting . Let Ve = maxl ^ V (c2(￿l))
29be the expected utility that the agent obtains in equilibrium.
Part (i) The proof is by contradiction. Assume that no information is gathered in equilibrium,
neither before nor after contracting; risk aversion, implies that the equilibrium allocation xe is such that
xe(￿n;s) = xe(s) for all ￿n. Moreover, as in equilibrium the incentive constraint is met as equality (e.g.











Now consider a contract b0 that prescribes to gather ￿l0 after contracting and implements the allocation








Now, for c2(￿l0) = 0, one has ^ Vl(c2(￿l0)) ￿ V 0 = V e , with ^ Vl(c2(￿l0)) > V 0 if xe does not solve the
equilibrium program (3) under the additional constraint ￿l = ￿l0. In addition, exactly the same argument
used in proposition (5) implies that the solution x0 of this program is such that x0(￿n0;s) 6= x0(￿n;s) for
at least a pair (n;n0). As a consequence, x0 6= xe; and Vl(c2(￿l0)) > V e for c2(￿l0) = 0. Moreover, since
Vl(c2(￿l0) is continuous in c2(￿l0); one also has Vl(c2(￿l0)) > V e for any c2(￿l0) su¢ ciently small. But this
implies that agents must necessarily gather information in equilibrium for c2(￿l) su¢ ciently small.
Part (ii) Let IC(￿l;￿c) be the set of incentive compatible contracts, parametrized with respect to
￿c(￿l); which prescribe to gather ￿l after contracting. For all positive ’, and for all l > 0, there exists a
su¢ ciently small value of ￿c such that ICl(￿c(￿l)) ￿ a(’;xi) where a(’;xi) is the Euclidean open ball
of diameter ’, centered on the allocation xi such xi(￿n;s) = xi(n;l) for all s. Moreover, for all positive  ,
there exists ￿c su¢ ciently small such that IC(￿0;￿c(￿l)) ￿ a( ;w), where a( ;w+r0) is the Euclidean
open ball centered on the point w+r0 = (:::;ws+r(a￿
0(￿n;s));:::) with diameter  . Since the agents prefer
xi to any allocation in IC(￿0;￿c(￿l)) whenever ￿c(￿l) su¢ ciently small, they must necessarily acquire
information in equilibrium if r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) ￿ 0 for all l. By continuity, for ￿c(￿l) su¢ ciently small for
all l, this remains true whenever r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) > ￿kl(￿c(￿l)), where kl(￿c(￿l)) is a decreasing function
taking positive, but su¢ ciently small values, in all its domain.
Part (iii) Consider a perfectly informative signal ￿l. Note that for any contract b0 which prescribes
￿l and condition payo⁄s on both signals realizations and states on nature , there exists another contract
b00 whose payo⁄ are contingent only on s which implement the same allocation as b0.Suppose now the
equilibrium contract be prescribes the agent to gather, after contracting, the perfectly informative signal
￿l; and that this signal is such that : r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l) < 0; and let xe be the equilibrium allocation. It is









30Now consider the contract that b0 which prescribes not to gather information at any stage and implements
the allocation x0(￿n;s)= xe(s) for all s 6= S and x0(￿n;S)=xe(s) ￿ (r(￿l) ￿ c2(￿l))=PS.By construction,








Moreover, since by assumption for all signals ￿l0 with l0 > 0, and for each n, there exists s such that










for ￿1 su¢ ciently small. Thus b0 is incentive compatible, makes positive pro￿ts and is preferred to be. It
follows that be cannot be the contract accepted by the agents in equilibrium. Finally, a careful continuity
argument allows to extend this result and to prove that the equilibrium contract will never prescribe
to gather a signal ￿l0 with l0 > 0 such that for each n there exists s such that pl(s=￿n) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿1, and
r(￿l0) ￿ c2(￿l0) < 0.
Proof of lemma 8 For all ￿ n = 2;:::;N, let de￿ne the probability distribution ￿￿ n;l as :












where P(￿ n) =
P
n￿n p(￿n). The proof is divided in two steps. The ￿rst, preliminary step proves that
(￿￿ n;l(sm)=￿￿ n;l+1(sm)) is increasing in m, for all ￿ n; which is, ￿￿ n;l satis￿es the monotone likelihood ratio



























mn is the entry corresponding to the m ￿ th row and the n ￿ th column of the stocastic matrix



























































Since pl(￿=s) satis￿es the monotone likelihood ratio property, the above expression is positive for all











where for each ￿ n = 2;:::;N, pk(sm;￿n j￿ n) are the entries of the ￿ n ￿ S matrix of joint probabilities
Pk(￿ n) such that :
pk(sm;￿n j￿ n) = pl(sm;￿n) for all n ￿ ￿ n + 1;








s;n￿n pk(sm;￿n j￿ n)(I(a(￿n);sm) >
P
s;n￿n pl(sm;￿n)(I(a(￿n);sm) follows from (￿￿ n;l(sm)=￿￿ n;l+1(sm))
increasing in in m for all ￿ n




s;n￿n pk(sm;￿n j￿ n)(I(a(￿n);sm)
for ￿ n = N ￿ 1. We shall prove by induction that this inequality holds for all n.






















pk(sm;￿N￿m j￿ n = N ￿ m)(I(a(￿n=N￿m);sm)+
X
m

























































































since [I(a(￿n￿ =N￿m￿1);sm) ￿ I(a(￿n=N￿m);sm)] is increasing in m and ￿l+1(m) =
PN
n=N￿m pl+1(sm;￿n)
dominates in the sense of ￿rst order stocastc dominance ￿l(m) =
PN
n=N￿m pl(sm;￿n) the second term is







holds for ￿ n = N ￿ m it also holds for N ￿ m ￿ 1.
Proof of proposition 9 By following the same logic developped in Proposition 5 one proves that, for
any l; the contract bl maximizing the agents￿expected utility in the set IC￿l(fblg[Bi)\￿￿l implements
the allocation x such that : x(s;￿n) = ￿ x for all (s;￿n) 2 ￿ N ￿ S; x(￿n;s) = ^ x for all (s;￿n) 2 ^ N ^ S; and
33x(￿n;s) =x; for all (s;￿n) 2 NS; for some partition } =
n
￿ N ￿ S ; ^ N ^ S;NS
o
of the set of states￿and signals














It is also straightforward to verify that if the number of states and signals is su¢ ciently large, as well
as in the case where each signal has only two realizations, there exists a contract b0 = (z0;~ ￿;a) with ~ ￿ =


















n);s) is increasing in n because signals and states



















These two inqualities imply that if each signal has only two possible realizations, or (Is￿Is￿1)=(ju00(x)=u0(x)j) >



















Proof of proposition 10 We begin by proving that an incentive compatible contract (z0;￿0;al0)
that prescribes to gather ￿l0 > ￿FB
l after contracting is never accepted in equilibrium, if o⁄ered. By
proposition 9, for any ￿l > ￿FB there exists another contract (^ z;￿FB
l ;a￿
l ) that prescribes ￿FB
l imple-
ments an allocation ^ x belonging to the interior of IC(￿FB












As a consequence, starting from any equilibrium candidate such that (z0;￿0;al0) is the contract pre-
ferred by the agent within the set of existing o⁄ers , any intermediary can pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering
(^ z ￿ ";￿Fb
l ;alFB), where " is a positive and su¢ ciently small real number. Such an o⁄er would indeed be
accepted by the agent in the subgame following the deviation.
Consider now any contract b = (z;￿FB
l ;a￿
l ) which prescibes the ￿rst best optimal signal ￿FB
l and let
x be the allocation associated with this contract. By proposition 9, there exists ^ b = (^ z;^ ￿l;^ al), with ^ ￿l
34smaller but su¢ ciently close to ￿FB
l ; which implements the allocation ^ x belonging to the interior of IC(^ ￿l)












plFB(￿n;s)^ x(￿n;s). Moreover, if plFB(￿n;s) ￿ p^ l(￿n;s) < ￿ with ￿ su¢ ciently small, for all ￿n and
s; Er(￿FB
l ) ￿ Er(^ ￿l) ￿ 0 since the change in the expected return is of second order with respect to ￿
around the ￿rst best optimal signal, ￿FB
l :The contractual proposal (^ z;^ ￿l;^ al), then is incentive compatible,
makes strictly positive pro￿ts and yields the agent an higher utility than (x;￿FB
l ,aFB
l ). As a consequence,
(x;￿FB
l ,aFB
l ) cannot be an equilibrium outcome and the signal that agents gather in equilibrium must
necessarily be less informative than ￿FB
l .
35References
Athey S. (1998) "Monotone comparative statics under uncertainty" Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXVII (1), February 2002, 187-223
Bergeman D., and J.Valimaki, 2002, "Information acquisition and e¢ cient mechanism design",
Econometrica, 70(3), 1007-1033.
Blackwell, D., 1953, "Equivalent Comparison of Experiments", Annals of Mathematical Statistics
24, 265-272.
Compte, O., and P. Jehiel, 2003, "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: a New
Perspective", Mimeo.
Green, J., 1981, "The Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets", Econometrica 49,
335-358.
Hirshleifer, J., 1971, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive
Activity, American Economic Review 61, 561-574.
Cremer J. and F. Khalil, 1992, "Gathering information before signing a contract" American Eco-
nomic Review, 82,3, 566-578.
Cremer J. and F. Khalil, 1994, "Gathering information before the contract is o⁄ered: The case
with two states of nature". European Economic Review, 38, 675-682.
Cremer J., F. Khalil, and J. Charles Rochet, 1998, "Contracts and productive information
gathering", Games and Economic Behavior, 25, 2, 174-193.
Cremer J., F. Khalil, and J. Charles Rochet, 1998, "Strategic information gathering before a
contract is o⁄ered" Journal of Economic Theory, 81, 163-200.
Jewitt I., 1987 "Risk aversion and the choice between risky projects : The preservation of comparative
statics results", Review of Economic Studies, 54, 73-85.
Marshall, J. M., 1974, "Private Incentives and Public Information", American Economic Review
64, 373-390.
Milgrom, P. and C. Shannon, 1994, "Monotone comparative statics" Econometrica, 62, 157-180
Morris, S. Shin H. S., 2002, ￿The Social Value of Public Information,￿American Economic Review
92, 1521-1534.
Persico N., 2000, "Information acquisition in auctions", Econometrica, 68 , 135-148.
Reinganum, J. F. 1989, "The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development,and Di⁄usion", in
Schmalensee, R. and Willig, R. D. (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam, North
Holland.
Shavell S., 1994 "Acquisition and Disclosure of inofrmation prior to sale" Rand Journal of Economics
, 25,1, 20-36.
Schlee, E., 2001, "The Value of Information in E¢ cient Risk Sharing Arrangements", American
Economic Review, 91(3), 509-524.
Wilson, R., 1975, "Informational Economies of Scale," Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 184-195.
36